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ABSTRACT
Community resilience is an important component of long- term planning for a town or a city.
Resilience generally refers to the ability of a system or a community to withstand a disruption and to
recover from a disruption, but specific definitions and measures for resilience can vary widely from
researcher to researcher or from discipline to discipline. Community resilience is often measured
using a set of indicators based on census, socioeconomic, and community organizational data, but
little research has attempted to assess how closely these measures correlate with a community’s
ability to withstand or recover from a disruption. Engineering resilience metrics often are based
on the “resilience triangle” concept. The resilience triangle assesses the loss in performance for
a system and the time until the system’s performance returns to its pre-disruption (or a better)
state. Although these concepts can be applied to community resilience, determining appropriate
metrics for the performance of a community remains a difficult challenge. This research proposes to
measure community resilience based on value-focused thinking. We propose an objectives hierarchy
that begins with a community decision makers’ fundamental values or objectives for community
resilience. Each of these five objectives is further broken down into measurable attributes that
focus on specific outcomes that a decision maker would like to achieve if a disruption occurs. Since
these attributes are very diverse and have different units, value functions can be used to assess the
contribution of each attribute toward the overall resilience.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
The current decade has seen several major disasters as Hurricane Maria and Hurricane Harvey,
the Camp Fire in Paradise California, and the 2016 blizzard in eastern United States (“Snowzilla”).
The frequency and the cost of these major disasters seem to be increasing. Disasters are uncer-
tain, and it may be impossible to identify and prepare for every possible disaster scenario. Even if
communities have prepared for specific disaster scenarios, each disaster behaves differently and can
lead to deadly consequences and large financial costs, among other serious consequences. Increas-
ing the resilience of communities can help these communities and their residents, neighborhoods,
infrastructure systems, economies, and government services withstand and recover from disruptive
events.
Resilience has been applied to many different disciplines, including ecology, infrastructure, busi-
ness, and economic systems. One area of research into resilience focuses on the resilience of com-
munities to disasters. Community resilience, also known as disaster resilience, is most commonly
defined as a measure of the sustained ability of a community to utilize available resources to re-
spond to, withstand, and recover from adverse situations (National Academies, 2012). At the state,
county, and community level, resilience is increasingly becoming part of the emergency prepared-
ness planning. Conceptualizing community resilience is important for local policymakers because
they need to determine where to allocate resources for emergency preparedness and how best to
plan for emergencies such that their communities will be more resilient to disasters. Having good
methods to assess community resilience can be very helpful to inform those decision makers. Nu-
merous studies, from perspectives of both social sciences and engineering, have attempted to assess
and measure community resilience.
Perhaps the most common way to assess community resilience is by selecting dozens of indicators
that are typically categorized into several dimensions. These indicators may be aggregated into
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a single number, a community resilience index. A community resilience index can be compared
among different communities or counties to understand which geographic areas are more or less
resilient to disasters. These indicators often are metrics for which data can be collected relatively
easy (e.g., census data) although some resilience indices require surveys of residents.
A common feature of virtually all of these indicators or metrics for community resilience is that
these indicators are inputs or characteristics of a community. For example, metrics might describe
the socioeconomic status of community residents, the degree of home ownership, the number of
civic or religious organizations within a community, or the size and revenue of businesses. The
logical reasoning is that these inputs or characteristics of the community help explain or predict
how well a community will fare during a disaster and how quickly it will recover after the disaster.
Some studies have investigated if these indicators and indices are correlated with outcomes from
a disaster such as property damage and fatalities. However, in order to truly measure community
resilience, it may be better to actually assess what is meant by the term resilience, namely the
ability of the community to withstand and recover from a disruption. Measuring the outputs or
outcomes from disasters rather than assessing inputs that may or may not have a strong relationship
to those outcomes may be a more appropriate assessment procedure.
Indicators currently suggested as assessments of community resilience seem to be selected in
part because they are easier to measure than the outcomes from a disaster. Data are often publicly
available for these indicators. However, the availability of data should not be confused with the
usefulness of that data for accurately describing resilience.
Very little evidence exists in the literature that the proposed community resilience indices
provide useful guidance for how a community should conduct emergency preparedness and planning.
For example, if one of the indicators to assess community resilience is the percentage of residents
with a high school diploma [3], should government officials attempt to increase the number of
high school graduates in order to make their communities more resilient to disasters? Although
increasing the number of high school graduates will likely have positive benefits for the community,
it is not at all clear that such a strategy should be part of emergency preparedness and planning.
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This thesis seeks to address some of these problems with many of the current methods for
assessing community resilience by proposing a new approach to assess community resilience. This
approach follows the principles of value-focused thinking, a popular method to analyze decision
problems with multiple objectives. Our method to assess community resilience requires community
leaders to identify fundamental objectives or outcomes that they want to achieve if a disaster
occurs. Based on extensive research into the disaster literature and through conversations with some
government officials, we propose dozens of outcome-focused objectives. By focusing on outcomes,
we can be more confident that a value-focused thinking approach to community resilience actually
captures elements that comprise and define community resilience. The value-focused thinking
approach to community resilience can also serve as a method to help policymakers understand and
compare the benefits of different alternatives for emergency preparedness. Thus, we believe the
approach outlined in this thesis can do a better job of providing more meaningful decision support
for allocating resources to enhance resilience.
The rest of the thesis is as follows. Chapter 2 reviews previous research efforts that present
various indices and methods to measure community resilience. Chapter 3 presents our method to
measure community resilience, which applies the principles of value focused thinking. Chapter 4
presents methods for operationalizing the objectives that were determined in chapter 3. Finally,
chapter 5 presents the conclusion of this thesis.
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CHAPTER 2. REVIEW OF LITERATURE
Resilience and social vulnerability indices can be used to help compare the vulnerability and
resilience of different communities to disasters [1, 2, 4, 8, 22]. Cutter [3] reviews 27 different dis-
aster or community resilience assessment procedures and identifies common elements among these
indices. She finds that the assessments of resilience can be categorized into community capacities
(social capacity, community functions, and planning) or assets (economic, social, environmental,
and infrastructure). Cutter et al. [2] propose a disaster resilience index comprised of five di-
mensions: social resilience, economic resilience, institutional resilience, infrastructure resilience,
and community capital. This disaster resilience index is applied to measure the resilience in 736
counties in the southeast United States.
The Community Disaster Resilience Index (CDRI) [13] uses the concept of capitals to define
and measure resilience. Capital assets are the inherent capacities that a community or a region has
at its disposal to deal with disasters. The CDRI incorporates 75 different indicators, categorized
into social capital, economic capital, physical capital, and human capital. The CDRI is applied to
counties in the Gulf Coast. The Resilience Capacity Index (RCI) measures the resilience capacity,
or the pre-disaster resilience level as an indicator of the potential performance of a location under
stress [14]. An economic resilience index [89] proposes that four major determinants (microeconomic
stability, microeconomic market efficiency, good governance, and social development) can help
predict how resilient a nation’s economy will be a to a severe economic shock.
Resilience indices or community resilience assessments typically identify several metrics or in-
dicators within each dimension, capacities, or function. Metrics are usually selected because they
describe how prepared a community or county is, or they describe the inherent capacity of insti-
tutions, societies, or the residents within a community that should help the community withstand
or recover from a disruption. For example, the “percent of population not speaking English as
5
a second language” measures language competency of residents, which should help the social re-
silience of a community; the “ratio of large to small businesses” describes the economic resilience of
a community; and “participation in in hazard reduction programs” is a metric for the institutional
capacity of a community [1, 2]. The metrics are frequently normalized and then assigned weights
in order to aggregate them into a single number, a single measure of resilience.
Many resilience and vulnerabilities indices are constructed and measured at the county level
because census data exist at the county level; however, Arup et al. [9] and Spaans and Waterhout
[10] introduce and discuss the city resilience framework. The resilience of cities is assessed along
four categories: the health and well being of residents, infrastructure and the environment, economy
and society, and leadership and strategy. These categories can be divided into twelve key indicators,
and each indicator can be assessed according to seven qualities (e.g., robust, redundant, flexible,
integrated). The resilience of the city of Rotterdam is examined as an application within this
framework, but the analysis is primarily qualitative as opposed to quantitative [10].
Longstaff et al. [7] propose to assess community resilience as a function of resource robustness
and adaptive capacity. Resource robustness refers to the availability and diversity of community’s
resources that could be used in the midst of a disruption. Adaptive capacity is more intangible
and refers to a community’s collective experience and memory and the community’s connectedness,
which the authors argue are important components to help a community withstand and recover from
a disruption. The authors provide a list of questions to help a community assess its performance
along these two dimensions.
Some researchers have questioned the appropriateness of indicators to measure community re-
silience or vulnerability. Socioeconomic indicators rely on census that may quickly become outdated
[5]. A metric may be included as an indicator because data for that metric are readily available
and not necessarily because the metric accurately describes vulnerability or resilience. Aggregating
indicators that measure completely different things may not be appropriate and may average or
hide important extremes within these indicators [25]. Methods for selecting indicators, collecting
data for these indicators, and weighting and aggregating these indicators into an index number
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may be so fraught with errors and uncertainties that policy makers should be very leery of using
these indices for making decisions and allocating resources [24].
Relatively little work has focused on whether these measures of resilience correlate with the
actual consequences a community experiences during and after a disaster. The results of these
validation studies suggest these resilience assessments are generally negatively correlated with neg-
ative outcomes from disasters (e.g., deaths, property damage), but the results are also very mixed
with significant variability. Aggregated scores for typical resilience dimensions (social, economic,
infrastructure, community capacity, institutional, and environmental) were found to be statistically
significant in predicting the recovery of communities after Hurricane Katrina, but the effects were
very small [23]. More resilient Gulf Coast communities as measured by the CDRI experience less
property damage and have fewer fatalities from floods but are also more likely to have more floods
leading to fatalities [13]. Bakkensen et al. [12] attempt to statistically validate three resilience
indices and two vulnerability indices according to the three outcomes: property damage, fatalities,
and frequency of disaster declarations. Two resilience indices and both vulnerability indices have
predictive power for two of the three outcome metrics, but none have predictive power for all three
outcomes. The third resilience index is statistically significant in predicting property damages and
disaster declarations but in the wrong direction. In other words, more resilient communities, as
measured by this third resilience index, experience greater property damages and more disasters.
Statistical tests have also been performed for social vulnerability indices [26] and to quantify the
relationship between social indicators and economic costs of disasters [6].
Another approach to assessing and measuring resilience appears in the engineering, infrastruc-
ture, and business literature [18, 100]. The foundational concept for many of these resilience
assessments is the “resilience triangle” which measures resilience according to a sudden decrease in
performance due to a disruptive event and the time after the event until recovery [16]. Enhancing
resilience is measured by decreasing the area of the triangle formed by the system’s performance
function over time [97]. A variety of extensions to this basic concept have been proposed, including
non-linear recovery [8], probabilistic assessments of resilience curves [98], time-dependent resilience
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[99]. Community resilience could theoretically be measured in a similar manner to these metrics
for infrastructure and engineering resilience [8], but measuring and even defining a community’s
performance before, during, and after a disruption is extremely challenging. Infrastructure perfor-
mance is much easier to assess. For example, the number of customers without electricity is a clear
metric to assess the performance of the electric power infrastructure during the time of a disruptive
event.
This thesis addresses these deficiencies with many of the current metrics and indices for com-
munity resilience. This thesis borrows from the existing literature on community resilience and
infrastructure resilience to propose a different way to measure and assess community resilience
through a value-focused thinking (VFT) approach. VFT was developed specifically to help a de-
cision maker select the best alternative for a multi-criteria decision problem [90]. VFT requires a
decision maker to focus first on his or her values and objectives that he or she wants to achieve
with a decision. VFT has been used to identify strategic objectives for an electric power utility
[91], identify objectives and quantify the effectiveness of homeland security strategies [19], achieve
consensus on decisions regarding the environment [91], and to assist communities in their planning
[92, 93]. To the authors’ knowledge, a VFT approach has not yet been applied to assessing or
measuring community resilience.
Community resilience indices or measures are typically labeled as indicators because they are
combinations of individual variables that represent different dimensions of community resilience.
Since the value-focused thinking approach also aggregates many variables, the approach presented
in this thesis could also be called an indicator. We prefer the term metric to emphasize that we are
seeking to measure community resilience. However, we do not intend to make a distinction between
the use of the term indicator and metric.
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CHAPTER 3. A VALUE-FOCUSED THINKING APPROACH TO
MEASURING COMMUNITY RESILIENCE
Many of the proposed resilience indices and metrics contain variables that are fairly easy to
measure, such as the percentage of females in the labor force. These variables may not accurately
describe what state and local government officials truly care about when they consider the resilience
of their communities to severe disruptions and natural disasters. This thesis proposes to measure
and assess community resilience by following VFT, which encourages decision makers to identify
their fundamental objectives and attributes that define those fundamental objectives. VFT can
broadly be divided into three activities: (i) identifying and structuring objectives, (ii) determining
value functions for individual attributes, and (iii) assessing trade-off weights among the objectives
and attributes [21].
A VFT approach helps form a very clear picture of the decision maker’s objectives and priorities.
The first activity of VFT, identifying and structuring objectives, frequently results in an objectives
hierarchy. An objectives hierarchy begins with a single objective, which in this case is to maximize
community resilience. That objective is decomposed into multiple fundamental objectives. Each of
these fundamental objectives is further decomposed into sub-objectives, and this process continues
until the bottom level of the objectives hierarchy consists of measurable attributes or metrics.
19 An objectives hierarchy thus helps create a clear path towards achieving the decision maker’s
objectives. VFT with identification of multiple objectives, formulation of value functions and
assignment of weights has been effectively applied and demonstrated in the context of energy and
homeland security [15, 20, 21].
This thesis uses an objectives hierarchy to identify measurable attributes that contribute to-
wards a community’s fundamental objective of maximizing its resilience. For VFT to be effective,
each attribute at the bottom level of the objectives hierarchy must have a measurable quantity
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associated with it. Using an objectives hierarchy fulfills two purposes: (i) eliminates the vagueness
of community resilience, and (ii) provides information about the decision makers’ real objectives
(i.e., what they really are concerned about in the context of a disaster).
Community resilience generally relates to a community’s ability to withstand, adapt to, and re-
cover from disruptions. Our approach identifies six fundamental objectives for community resilience:
(i) maximize social resilience, (ii) maximize economic resilience, (iii) maximize infrastructure re-
silience, (iv) maximize environmental resilience, (v) maximize availability and use of resources,
and (vi) maximize post-disaster functionality of critical services. These six fundamental objectives
are similar to the broad categories or capacities that many researchers have proposed to measure
community resilience. The unique element about this thesis is that the attributes that are used to
measure each of these six fundamental objectives are comprised of outcomes rather than inputs or
characteristics of the community.
3.1 Social resilience
Social resilience is defined by a disruption’s impacts on community residents. A community
exists to benefit its residents, and community leaders want to protect and make sure those residents
are resilient to disruptive events. Every measure of community or disaster resilience that we know
of incudes metrics related to residents of a community. As depicted in Table 1, social resilience in
this thesis is decomposed into three components: (i) socially vulnerable (SV) residents, (ii) non-SV
residents, and (iii) psychological resilience. As will be explained in the following paragraph, each
of these three components are further broken down into metrics or measurable attributes. These
attributes focus on the outcomes or consequences of a disaster because community leaders will be
most interested in gaining insight into how disasters will affect these metrics. Although the list
of attributes is designed to capture the most important elements of social resilience, community
leaders may identify other elements or metrics of social resilience about which they are concerned.
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Table 3.1: Attributes to measure social resilience
1. Social resilience
1.1 Socially vulnerable (SV) residents
1.1.1 Minimize fatalities
1.1.2 Minimize injuries
1.1.3 Minimize number of displaced residents




1.2.3 Minimize number of displaced residents
1.2.4 Maximize number of displaced residents who find new housing
1.3 Psychological resilience
1.3.1 Minimize residents’ fear
1.3.2 Minimize symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder
1.3.3 Minimize personal disruption of lifestyle
1.3.4 Minimize inconvenience to residents
A community’s SV residents (e.g., lower income groups, racial minorities, the elderly) often
suffer disproportionately from disruptions [27]. In light of this information, we separate the social
resilience of SV residents from the social resilience of non-SV residents. This distinction allows
community leaders to focus on the most vulnerable residents and those people who are most likely
to be harmed by a disruption while also tracking metrics corresponding to the majority, or the
non-SV, proportion of the community.
The attributes for both SV and non-SV residents of a community consist of fatalities, injuries,
displaced residents, and residents who find new housing. Jonkman et al. [30] provide a model to
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estimate fatalities from small-probability, large-consequence events. This model could be used by
communities to forecast the number of fatalities that may occur from a disruptive event. The model
combines the system characteristics, physical effects, evacuation models, the number of people at
risk, and a dose-response function to estimate the loss of life.
Even if residents’ lives are spared and they are uninjured, they require adequate housing and
shelter. Thus, the components for SV residents and for non-SV events each include two attributes
for housing: (i) minimizing the number of residents displaced from their homes and (ii) maximizing
the number of displaced residents who find new housing. The ideal for a community during a
disruption would be that no residents are displaced from their houses. However, since that ideal is
often unattainable, communities will desire that those displaced residents have adequate housing
and shelter. This could be because some residents stay with friends or family, the community
establishes large shelters for displaced people to stay, and the government provides individual
shelters (e.g., mobile trailers) for residents who have lost housing. Frameworks and models have
been proposed to integrate different scientific perspectives into post-disaster decision making and
housing recovery for SV residents [28].
Large-scale disruptions can have lasting effects on the social cohesion of a community [29], and
the psychology of residents plays a very important role in averting further losses and in recovery
efforts. Residents’ sentiments toward their community provide predictive power in determining
psychological resilience to hazards such as toxic waste, salinity, and volcanoes. An individual’s
socioeconomic disadvantage, which could be driven by race, unemployment, or economic status,
are associated with a greater likelihood of psychiatric disorder. Thus, the third component under
social resilience is the psychological resilience of community residents.
Psychological resilience will probably be most important for intentional incidents such as a ter-
rorist attack or a mass shooting, but it may also be important for recovery from natural disasters.
From the psychological literature, adult resilience can be defined as the ability of adults who are ex-
posed to a traumatic or highly disruptive event to maintain a relatively healthy functioning of their
psychological, emotional, and physical states [96]. Much of the most recent literature on psycho-
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logical resilience has focused on the psychological impacts from the September 11 terrorist attacks
although some research on the psychological resilience to Hurricane Sandy has been conducted, as
well as children’s ability to cope with flooding after Hurricane Floyd.
Our framework proposes four attributes to measure psychological resilience: fear, post-traumatic
stress disorder, disruption to lifestyle, and inconvenience. In their objective hierarchy for homeland
security, Keeney and von Winterfelt [31] propose that fear, disruption to lifestyle, and inconvenience
are three attributes that can be used to assess the social impacts of decision making for homeland
security. The objectives hierarchy presented here borrows the same attributes because they are also
important for determining how to make a community more resilient to disruptive events. Surveying
residents could provide a means to measure these attributes. A Fear of Terrorism Scale is based on
survey respondents’ answers to a score of questions. Medical research has used a fear of death scale
in order to assess individuals’ attitudes toward rare illnesses and has been extended to terrorist
attacks. Post-traumatic stress syndrome, depression, and substance abuse can all be indicators or
metrics of psychological resilience (or the lack of resilience).
3.2 Economic resilience
The economy of a community is vital to its survival. In order to ensure the survival and good
health of a community, it is important to protect the economy from the adverse consequences of the
disaster. Increasing the economy’s resilience helps protect the economy from damage and enables
the economy to recover more quickly. Rose [42] quantifies economic resilience in two different ways.
Static resilience measures the difference between the estimated percent change in economic output
and the maximum percent change in total output. Dynamic resilience is measured as the gain in
economic output achieved by better repair, reconstruction, and recovery activities. In line with
previous work, the metrics in this section aim to capture impact of a disruption on the economy
and recovery of the economy.
Economic losses are frequently divided into direct losses (including the cost of damaged and
destroyed buildings and the loss of industrial functions) and the indirect losses (second and third-
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order effects that are induced by the direct losses). The hierarchy for economic resilience (Table
2) includes a metric in order to address direct losses. Direct losses typically include the cost of in-
frastructure damage, debris removal and reconstruction. However, indirect losses include cascading
losses as a result of direct losses, infrastructure damage and loss of functionality which in turn lead
to business, workforce, and income losses.
Table 3.2: Attributes to measure economic resilience
2. Economic resilience
2.1 Minimize direct losses ($)
2.2 Business resilience
2.2.1 Minimize number of business closures
2.2.2 Minimize length of time of business closures
2.2.3 Minimize number of businesses that cannot reopen
2.3 Workforce resilience
2.3.1 Minimize number of residents who cannot find jobs or work again
2.3.2 Minimize time that residents cannot find work
2.3.3 Minimize number of available jobs that cannot find suitable employees
2.3.4 Minimize time until available jobs are filled
2.4 Income losses
2.4.1 Minimize income losses of SV residents
2.4.2 Minimize income losses of non-SV residents
2.4.3 Minimize residential losses that are not insured
Many models used to measure losses, such as the input-output model, the social accounting ma-
trix, and the computable general equilibrium model have evolved to incorporate disaster-specific
factors [32]. One approach used to measure the economic impacts is by using a dynamic inop-
erability input output model (IIM). Many studies have tailored the IIM to suit specific scenarios
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[35-37]. In a non-IIM approach, Hallegate [33] attempted to estimate the impacts of a natural dis-
aster on the supply chain using an ARIO inventory model. There are also methods to estimate the
impact of a disaster induced supply chain constraint where input-output models are not applicable
[34]. Martinelli et al. [41] provide a framework based on HAZUS to assess the economic impact of
natural disasters.
Since the health of an economy is dependent on the financial health of both enterprises and
residents, business resilience and income losses attempt to capture the effects of the event on
businesses and residents, respectively. Business resilience focuses on the post-disaster operations
or closures of businesses and on how the disaster has affected the workforce availability.
Surveys of business after a disaster can provide insight into how business are impacted by the
event and on their speed and effectiveness of recovery. Zobel [44] applies the infrastructure resilience
of Bruneau et al. [45] to quantify the resilience of businesses and organizations. He measures
the resilience of business based on lost performance and the time to recover to full performance.
Similarly, the number of business that close and the length of time that it takes them to reopen are
the metrics in this thesis used to measure business resilience. The number of permanently closed
businesses are also addressed in the hierarchy.
Most of the studies cited in the previous paragraphs focus on the economic impact of a dis-
ruption, but significant research has also modeled economic recovery. Webb et al. [39] argue that
long-term recovery of businesses is affected by various firm characteristics, including the prevailing
market conditions, physical damage and disruption of operations. Porter [40] argues that regional
economies impacted by the Deepwater Horizon oil spill would recover more slowly because of the
global economic recession. Stock markets have been shown to be resilient to shocks caused by
earthquakes [38].
Income losses address the financial effects of the disaster on community residents. It considers
many different sources of income like wages and rent. Some disasters may have minimal impact
on total employment, but there can be significant drops in personal income [43]. This category
has been further divided into income losses for SV and non-SV residents to focus attention that
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SV residents may suffer more from income losses than non-SV residents. Workforce resilience is
measured as the number of people that are out of work and the time it takes for people to resume
working. Workforce resilience also includes the loss of employees and the time it takes for businesses
to find new employees.
3.3 Infrastructure resilience
The failure of infrastructure systems can cripple a community. Infrastructure systems may
be very vulnerable to damage during natural disasters. To ensure a functioning community, it is
important to protect these systems and to repair any damages quickly. We address the resilience
of infrastructure systems in terms of the damage sustained by the systems i.e. impact and the
time and effort required for their restoration i.e. recovery. Since the failures of infrastructure
systems will be mostly due to physical damage, the impacts are measured as such and the time
for recovery is measured in days. As depicted in Table 3, infrastructure resilience is comprised
of debris management, critical infrastructure resilience, and non-critical infrastructure resilience.
These three categories of resilience will be further decomposed into their respective components.
The resilience of infrastructure systems is a popular topic for researchers in engineering. Some
studies have proposed resilience indices specifically for infrastructure systems. Fischer et al.’s
[47] resilience index (RI), ranging from 0 to 100, is derived from three categories: robustness,
resourcefulness, and recovery. The IIM, network models, and “fragility” functions have all been
proposed to assess resilience [48, 49]. Many frameworks assess the resilience of infrastructure
systems in terms of two dimensions: robustness (ability to withstand impact) and rapidity (time
to recovery) [50].
Post-disaster debris can cause further accidents and damage and will generally be an obstacle
to recovery efforts [62]. Removing debris is necessary to facilitate the recovery of the affected
region. The more quickly debris can be cleared, the more quickly the community can recover. This
component is measured as the time taken to clear debris. Debris can be estimated based on the
type of debris (e.g., structural, trees, sediment, mixed), the location, and volume of the structure
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[63]. Simulation can be used to model the time to remove debris based on the expected volume
and the ability of debris management services.
The criticality of infrastructure components depends on which sets are damaged or destroyed
by a disruption [46]. Table 3 depicts four critical infrastructures: transportation, energy, com-
munication systems, and waste management. These seem to be the most critical because of the
amount of attention and focus that disaster researchers have spent studying these systems. Water
infrastructure could be another critical infrastructure system, but that is included in the hierarchy
for resource resilience.
Table 3.3: Attributes to measure infrastructure resilience
3. Infrastructure resilience
3.1 Minimize time to clear debris and remove damaged buildings and infrastructure
3.2 Critical infrastructure resilience
3.2.1 Transportation resilience
3.2.1.1 Highway and road resilience
3.2.1.1.1 Minimize miles of highway and road closures
3.2.1.1.2 Minimize time that highways and roads are closed
3.2.1.2 Airport resilience
3.2.1.2.1 Minimize number of cancelled flights
3.2.1.2.2 Minimize time to recovery of normal airport operations
3.2.1.3 Waterway resilience
3.2.1.3.1 Minimize number or percentage of waterway port closures
3.2.1.3.2 Minimize time until ports reopen or return to full operations
3.2.2 Energy resilience
3.2.2.1 Electricity resilience
3.2.2.1.1 Minimize number of residential homes without electricity
3.2.2.1.2 Minimize time that residential homes do not have electricity
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Table 3.3 (continued)
3.2.2.2.3 Minimize number of commercial buildings without electricity
3.2.2.2.4 Minimize time that commercial buildings to not have electricity
3.2.2.2 Gas resilience
3.2.2.2.1 Minimize number of residential homes without gas
3.2.2.2.2 Minimize time that residential homes do not have gas
3.2.2.2.3 Minimize number of commercial buildings without gas
3.2.2.2.4 Minimize time that commercial buildings do not have gas
3.2.2.3 Maximize availability of fuel (i.e. gasoline)
3.2.3 Communications and information technology resilience
3.2.3.1 Minimize number of telephone lines or poles damaged
3.2.3.2 Minimize time to repair telephone lines or poles
3.2.3.3 Minimize number of people who lose Internet connectivity
3.2.3.4 Minimize time to restore Internet connectivity
3.2.4 Waste management resilience
3.2.4.1 Minimize sewage line closures
3.2.4.2 Minimize time to restore sewage line closures
3.3 Non-critical infrastructure resilience
3.3.1 Minimize number of destroyed houses
3.3.2 Minimize time to replace destroyed houses
3.3.3 Minimize number of damaged homes
3.3.4 Minimize time to repair damage homes
Transportation resilience addresses three major modes of transportation: roadways, airways,
and waterways. These transportation systems are very important for recovery efforts since they
can be used for evacuations as well as to bring in additional resources. The impacts and recovery
of these systems rely on metrics that are appropriate for the mode of transport. For example,
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the impact on roadways is measured by the number of road closures, and the impact of airways
is measured by the number of cancelled flights. The wealth of studies that analyze the effects
of disruptions on transportation systems reinforces their importance towards the functioning of a
community, and why it is important to include them in studies regarding resilience.
A common approach to enhance resilience of transportation networks is the usage of stochastic
modeling or stochastic programming or their variants [51-54]. Many studies measure the impacts
on supply chain caused by the physical damage to transportation systems [55-56]. Transporta-
tion disruptions can also lead to significant business interruption losses [57]. Chang and Nojima
evaluate the post-disaster performance of Kobe city’s transportation network in terms of network
coverage and transport accessibility [58]. These types of studies can be used to understand how a
community’s transportation system might be impacted by different types of disruptive events.
To account for the different forms of energy available to a community resident, energy resilience
is decomposed into electricity resilience, gas resilience, and fuel resilience. The attributes consist of
the impacts and recovery time for both residential customers and business customers. Research in
energy resilience approximate the impact of disruptions on energy supply. MacKenzie and Barker
[59] provide a data-driven approach to derive a resilience parameter through regression models
with electric power outage data. Spatial generalized linear mixed modeling applied to grid cells in
a region can be used to predict the number of outages likely to occur as a result of storms [60].
Damage to the electric power system due to hurricanes can be assessed by modeling the expected
damage to electric poles [61].
Communication, in some form, is an important component of most if not all community re-
silience models [11, 69]. Communication systems and resources represent the reservoirs in which
community meaning-making, information exchange, interactions, and connections can occur [67].
Communication technologies are extremely important in mitigating and preventing disasters [65].
Communication and information systems are also important for coordination operations during and
after the disaster. The objectives hierarchy focuses on telephone poles and Internet connectivity.
Damage to communication networks can be assessed through field collected data and information
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and by garnering availability [66]. In the hierarchy, communication resilience seeks to minimize
impacts and minimize recovery time for Internet systems and telephone poles.
The resilience of waste management capabilities is measured by the impact and recovery of
sewage lines in the affected region. Basic sanitation facilities and access to basic hygiene may be
unavailable or worsen due to natural disasters [71]. Waste that is not properly managed are a
serious health hazard and can further the spread of infectious diseases [70].
Non-critical infrastructure is also addressed in the hierarchy because it impacts the quality of
life of community residents. Non-critical infrastructure resilience aims to capture the concerns the
decision maker may have about the residents’ personal immovable property such as their homes.
The hierarchy addresses this concern by including objectives that aim to minimize the number of
destroyed and damaged homes and the time it takes for these homes to be habitable again.
3.4 Environmental resilience
Disruptions - whether caused by humans or by nature - can also damage the environment.
The specific attributes that measure the environment are likely very geographic-specific. However,
some simple attributes that are applicable to a wide range of communities and locations are the
geographic area of natural habitat, the number of animals impacted, and pollution.
Damage to the environment can often lead to the extinction or exodus of different plants and
animals that could be crucial to the local ecosystem. Significant biomass decline facilitated by
tree mortality and tree injury is one of the immediate effects of an earthquake [72]. The 2004
Indian ocean tsunami lead to changes and uprooting in the mangrove population due to seawater
inundation [73]. The resilience framework presented in Table 4 assesses environmental impacts
as the acreage of the habitat destroyed and the time for the habitat to recover. The recovery of
habitats may be very different compared to other recoveries. Habitats sometimes take decades to
recover to a pre-disaster state. The habitat may never be restored to its pre-disruption state. In
such cases, recovery can be measured as the time until the community adapts to the “new” habitat.
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Table 4 also includes the impacts on individual animals. These animals can be further categorized
into species depending upon their importance in maintaining the ecosystem balance.
Table 3.4: Attributes to measure environmental resilience
4. Environmental resilience
4.1 Minimize square miles of habitat destroyed
4.2 Minimize time until habitat is restored
4.3 Minimize number of animals impacted (could be categorized according to species)
4.4 Pollution
4.4.1 Minimize pollution in air
4.4.2 Minimize pollution in water
4.4.3 Minimize pollution in soil
The impacts on the environment such as pollution should be measured in appropriate units
such as parts per million for air and water pollution. Forest fires and fires from earthquakes and
volcanic eruptions pollute the air and water. Volcanic eruptions are notorious for emitting vast
quantities of polluting gases and ash resulting in global temperature changes [74, 75]. Floods can
contaminate the soil and even saturate it with water. Given the importance of soil fertility and
stability to agriculture and to construction projects, minimizing soil pollution is included as one of
the objectives in environmental resilience.
3.5 Resource resilience
Resources include consumables like food and water and the sources of these consumables such
as agriculture and livestock. Resource resilience (Table 5) is decomposed in order to address
agriculture, food, and potable water. Agriculture resilience is further decomposed into metrics that
measure the yield lost as a result of the disruption and the time taken to restore the pre-disruption
state of agricultural yield. Agriculture resilience also aims to minimize the loss of livestock. If
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the disruption impacts a rural area where agriculture is a major component of the community, the
impact and time to recovery of agriculture may be very important to assess community resilience.
If the region is urban, the decision maker may not place much importance on agricultural resilience
and can choose to focus more on food resilience. Resource shortages also lead to broader economic
consequences over a period of time [78].
Table 3.5: Attributes to measure resource resilience
5. Resource resilience
5.1 Agricultural resilience
5.1.1 Minimize agricultural yield loss
5.1.2 Minimize time to recover agricultural loss (e.g. harvest cycles)
5.1.3 Minimize loss of livestock
5.2 Food resilience
5.2.1 Minimize number of people without sufficient food
5.2.2 Minimize time until food shortage ends
5.3 Maximize availability of potable water
Resource resilience aims to minimize food shortages. Food resilience is measured in terms of
amount of food shortage and the time it takes to end the shortage. Israel and Briones’ [79] study
in the Philippines found that typhoons negatively impact paddy rice production and the food
security of the households in the affected areas. Tropical cyclones, floods, and droughts can also
substantially impact natural resources. Natural disasters can affect multiple dimensions of food
security such as the availability of supplies, access to food, and utilization. People in remote areas
often suffer disproportionally from significant shortfalls in food availability [81].
Given the importance of potable water to sustenance of human life and activity, resource re-
silience also seeks to maximize the availability of potable water to community residents. Aubuchon
and Morley [80] assess the monetary benefit of continuing to provide water after a disruptive event
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to both businesses and residents. Luna et al. [77] use colored Petri nets to simulate the behavior
and restoration process of a water distribution network in Tokyo following an earthquake. Water
supply networks may also be vulnerable to physical attacks [76].
3.6 Post-disaster functionality of critical services
Emergency services are critically important to mitigate the effects of a disruption. However,
the services themselves can also be susceptible to the effects of a disruption either because the
disruption directly affects these services or because the services’ capabilities are overstretched by
the disruption. The objectives hierarchy (Table 6) includes the ability of the medical, police,
fire, educational, and social services to continue to provide necessary functions during and after a
disaster.
Table 3.6: Attributes to measure functionality of critical ser-
vices
6. Post-disaster functionality of critical services
6.1 Medical services
6.1.1 Maximize ratio of post-disruption capability to pre-disruption capability
6.2 Police services
6.2.1 Maximize number of law enforcement officers available post-disruption
6.3 Fire management services
6.3.1 Maximize number of firefighters available post-disruption
6.4 Education services
6.4.1 Maximize number of schools open post-disaster
6.4.2 Minimize amount of time until all schools are reopened
6.4.3 Maximize number of students who attend schools
6.5 Social, safety-net services
6.5.1 Maximize number of employees working in social, safety-net services
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The functionality of medical services can be assessed as a percentage of the pre-disaster con-
dition. Medical services must consider the availability of both personnel and emergency medi-
cal equipment for considerably high emergency patient traffic. Hospital emergency departments
throughout the United States are severely crowded, which raises concerns about their ability to
respond to mass casualty or volume surges [82]. Many medical facilities that would need to respond
to a disaster might have inadequate disaster plans [94, 95]. Medical facilities can also be damaged
by the disruptive event, which can lead to the loss of vital services, as occurred during the 1994
Northridge earthquake [83].
The functionality of the police and fire departments can be measured based on the number
of available personnel after the disaster. The personnel and equipment of these services can be
physically impacted by the disruption, reducing their effectiveness, and potentially rendering them
ineffective. Emergency workers pressed into service during times of crisis are seriously affected by
the emergency work [86]. According to surveys, emergency personnel may not participate equally
in the response to different threats [87].
Education plays a central role in a community. Apart from being centers of learning, they
routinely serve as designated shelters during a disruption [84]. Disruptions can negatively impact
the educational function of schools because they mentally affect students and cause disturbances in
coursework [85]. It is the interest of students, their families, and the community to restore schools’
functioning as soon as possible.
For residents who are unable to work or unable to support themselves, a natural disaster makes
matters much worse. Social safety nets are an absolute necessity for such residents. Another metric
of resilience is the functioning of safety net services as they offer social protection and social risk
management, thereby reducing impact and aiding in recovery [88].
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CHAPTER 4. OPERATIONALIZING OBJECTIVES FOR COMMUNITY
RESILIENCE
Perhaps the biggest challenge with using this objectives hierarchy and these attributes to assess
community resilience is the difficulty in assigning a number for each attribute, especially prior to a
disruption. A community could assess many of these attributes after a disruption occurs. However,
since a resilience index and associated metrics should be able inform decision making, state and
local government officials need to be able to assess a community’s resilience before a disruption and
understand how resilience can be enhanced through emergency preparedness.
Modeling and analytical tools can help a community assign numbers to these attributes. Data
from previous disruptions -both disruptions experienced by the community and disruptions in other
locations that resemble those that the community might experience - could be used to assess each
attribute. Simulation provides a powerful method to understand the impacts of different types of
disruptions with varying degrees of severity. As cited in the chapter describing the attributes for
each objective, mathematical models have been proposed to describe how disruptions impact the
performance of specific systems (e.g., transportation infrastructure, economic activity). Assigning
probability distributions can quantify the uncertainty that usually exists in each of these attributes.
Until now, the discussion has centered around the first step of VFT, identifying and structuring
objectives. We defined objectives and the metrics that measure progress towards the objectives. In
order evaluate and compare among alternatives to enhance community resilience, VFT recommends
combining all of the attributes into a single number through a multi-attribute value function. A
multi-attribute value function frequently relies on individual value functions over the attributes.
The individual value function provides a way to scale the level of metrics from a numerical value
in its own units to a real number between 0 and 1. Value functions make it easier to compare and
aggregate metrics that have different units.
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Value functions are preferable to just normalizing an attribute because value functions incorpo-
rate the decision maker’s preferences about the attribute. A linear value function - which is similar
to normalizing the attribute - means the value or usefulness of an attribute increases or decreases
linearly with respect to the metric for the attribute. Concave value functions are used for attributes
with diminishing marginal returns and convex value functions for increasing marginal returns.
After the individual value functions have been determined and applied to calculate values for
each individual attribute, the values can be aggregated to calculate a single number reflecting
community resilience. In many multi-attribute decision problems, the type of function to aggregate
these values is an additive value function. An additive value function is only justified if all of the
attributes are mutually preferentially independent or value independent. Attributes are mutually
preferential independent if an individual value function does not depend on the specific levels or
trade-offs among the other attributes. If all the attributes are mutually preferentially independent,




where R is resilience, wi is the trade-off weight corresponding to attribute i, and vi is the value
corresponding to attribute i.
Some attributes identified in the previous chapter are mutually preferential independent. For
example, a decision maker’s value function for the number of fatalities will likely remain the same
whether many customers are without electric power or only a few customers are without power.
However, many of the components of resilience consist of an attribute describing the impact
and another attribute describing recovery time. The attributes of impact and recovery time for
a resilience component are not mutually preferentially independent. For example, if only a few
customers are without electric power, a community decision maker’s value function for recovery
would likely be relatively constant over the days until full recovery. If many customers are without
electric power, the decision maker’s value function would likely be nonlinear because a decision
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maker would perceive a lot more value in full recovery in 1 day than in 30 days. The following
value function v(impact,time) could be used to relate the impact and time until recovery:
v(impact, time) = kimpactv(impact) + ktimev(time) + (1 − kimpact − ktime)v(impact)v(time) (2)
where kimpact and ktime are weights on the importance of impact and time, respectively, v(impact)
is the individual value function for impact, and v(time) is the individual value function for the time
of recovery. The attributes impact and time can be considered as substitutes for each other, which
means that kimpact + ktime > 1. The attributes are substitutes because if recovery can occur in-
stantly (i.e., time = 0), then v(impact, 0) = 1 for any level of impact. Similarly, if there are no
impacts (i.e., impact = 0), then v(0, time) = 1 for any level of recovery time.
Another approach can eliminate the use of independent value functions and their corresponding
coefficients for the attributes impact and time. The resilience triangle, developed by Bruneau et al.
[16], provides a method to use the product of the magnitude of impact and recovery time. Zobel
[18] measures resilience as the area under the curve (i.e., the triangle) which is normalized by the
maximum impact and the maximum time in order to ensure resilience is bounded between 0 and
1. Based on the concept of the resilience triangle, using the product of impact and recovery time
in the value function seems appropriate:
v(impact, time) = 1 − impact ∗ time
impactmax ∗ timemax
(3)
where impactmax is the maximum tolerable impact and timemax is the maximum tolerable
recovery time.
Uncertainty will exist with many and possibly all of the attributes presented in this thesis.
Consequently, a multi-attribute utility function should be used in place of a multi-attribute value
function. Value functions are designed to capture preferences when attributes are certain, but
utility functions are used when attributes are uncertain in order to capture the risk attitude of
the decision maker. Many of the equations presented above could be used with utility functions
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under certain assumptions. For example, an additive utility function similar to Equation (1) is
appropriate if the attributes are additive independent, which is a more stringent condition than
mutually preferential independent. Another approach is to calculate the multi-attribute value
function and then to incorporate a decision maker’s risk attitude over those values to construct a
utility function.
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to aggregate these attributes into a value function or utility
function. The specifics of the aggregation scheme including the individual value functions and
the trade-off weights for each attribute will depend on the specific community. Decision analysis
has provided numerous examples demonstrating how to derive value and utility functions and
trade-off weights for a wide variety or private-sector and public-sector decision problems in which
the problems contain scores of attributes. These same techniques can also be applied to help a
community leader construct a resilience metric that aggregates the attributes in the objectives
hierarchy.
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CHAPTER 5. APPLICATION OF FRAMEWORK
This chapter demonstrates how the proposed framework can be used to make decisions. The
example used is completely artificial and not based on any studies.
Consider a city approximately the size of Des Moines, Iowa. The leaders of the city are planning
on making their community more resilient to disruptions. The city leadership needs to determine
the best strategies to make their community better prepared and more resilient to disruptions. The
city leaders are considering four alternatives, and these four alternatives are assessed using the
attributes discussed in Chapter 3.
The rest of this chapter demonstrates how our framework can be used to determine the best
strategy.
5.1 Value functions
First, the leadership’s value function for each attribute should be established using the best case
and worst case scenarios for each attribute. The value function is a reflection of how the decision
maker thinks about each attribute.
This exercise results in value functions that are linear or exponential and value functions that
are mutual dependent. Mutual dependent value functions are a combination of impact and recovery
time.
v(impact, time) = 1 − impact ∗ time
impactmax ∗ timemax
(5.1)
where impactmax is the maximum tolerable impact and timemax is the maximum tolerable
recovery time.
The city leadership’s value functions are depicted in Tables 5.1 - 5.6.
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Table 5.1: Value functions of social resilience attribute
Attribute Units Best case Worst case
Value
function
Fatalities (SV residents) Count 0 150 Linear
Injuries (SV residents) Count 0 1500 Linear
Displaced residents (SV) % residents 0 25 Linear








Count 0 200 Linear
Injuries (non-SV residents) Count 0 2500 Linear
Displaced residents (non-
SV)
% residents 0 35 Linear






Residents’ fear % residents 0 75 Linear
Symptoms of PTSD % residents 0 30 Linear
Personal disruption of
lifestyle
% residents 0 100 Linear
Inconvenience to residents % residents 0 100 Linear
Number of people who relo-
cate from the community
% residents 0 20 Linear
Table 5.2: Value functions of economic resilience attributes
Attribute Units Best case Worst case
Value
function
Direct losses Dollars 0 1,000,000,000 Exponential
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Table 5.2 (continued)
Number of business closures Count 0 300
Mut. dependent
Length of time of business
closure
Days 0 180
Number of permanent busi-
ness closures
Count 0 200 Linear
Number of residents who
cannot find jobs or work
again
% residents 0 10 Linear
Number of residents who
cannot find jobs
% residents 0 20 Linear
Number of available jobs
that cannot find suitable
employees
% of jobs 0 100
Mut. dependent
Time until available jobs
are filled
Days 0 365
Income losses of SV resi-
dents
Dollars 0 15,000,000 Linear
Income losses of non-SV
residents
Dollars 0 100,000,000 Linear
Residential losses that are
not insured
Dollars 0 200,000,000 Linear
Table 5.3: Value functions of infrastructure resilience at-
tributes
Attribute Units Best case Worst case
Value
function
Time to clear debris Days 0 30 Exponential
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Table 5.3 (continued)




Time for which highways
and roads are closed
Days 0 30
Number of cancelled flights Count 0 100
Mut. dependent
Time to restore normal air-
port operations
Days 0 90
Number of waterway port
closures
% of ports 0 100
Mut. dependent







Time that residential homes















Time that residential homes





















Time to repair telephone
lines/poles
Days 0 180




Time to restore internet
connectivity
Days 0 210




Time to restore sewage lines Days 0 30
Number of destroyed homes Count 0 750
Mut. dependent
Time to replace destroyed
homes
Days 0 1095
Number of damaged homes Count 0 5000
Mut. dependent
Time to repair damaged
homes
Days 0 1825
Table 5.4: Value functions of environmental resilience at-
tributes
Attribute Units Best case Worst case
Value
function
Square miles of habitat de-
stroyed









Number of animals im-
pacted
Count 0 7500 Linear
Pollution in air Air quality
index
150 0 Linear
Pollution in water Water quality
index
90 25 Linear
Pollution in soil Soil Quality
index
100 20 Linear
Table 5.5: Value functions for resource resilience attributes
Attribute Units Best case Worst case
Value
function
Agricultural yield loss Tons 0 1,000,000
Mut. dependent





Loss of livestock Count of ani-
mals
0 250,000 Linear




Time until food shortage
ends
Days 0 30







Table 5.6: Value functions of post-disaster functionality of
critical services
Attribute Units Best case Worst case
Value
function
Ratio of post-disruption ca-
pability to pre-disruption
capability of medical ser-
vices





















Time until all schools are
reopened
Days 0 60






Number of employees work-








Since we will use a weighted additive function to determine resilience, we must determine
appropriate weights for each attribute’s value function. Weights can be elicited from a decision
maker using various methods, but in this application, swing weighting was used. The weights for
each attribute is provided in Table 5.7.
Table 5.7: Attributes and their weights
Attribute Value function Global weights
Fatalities (SV residents) Linear 0.0507
Injuries (SV residents) Linear 0.0279
Displaced residents (SV) Linear 0.0178
New housing for displaced residents (SV) Linear 0.01015
Fatalities (non-SV residents) Linear 0.0482
Injuries (non-SV residents) Linear 0.0264
Displaced residents (non-SV) Linear 0.0170
New housing for displaced residents (non-SV) Linear 0.0096
Residents’ fear Linear 0.0123
Symptoms of PTSD Linear 0.0136
Personal disruption of lifestyle Linear 0.0035
Number of people who relocate from the community Linear 0.0185
Inconvenience to residents Linear 0.0027
Direct losses Exponential 0.0692
Number of business closures
Mutual dependent 0.0142
Length of time of business closure
Number of permanent business closures Linear 0.0174
Number of residents who cannot find jobs or work again Linear 0.0129
Number of residents who cannot find jobs Linear 0.0082





Time until available jobs are filled
Income losses of SV residents Linear 0.0093
Income losses of non-SV residents Linear 0.0078
Residential losses that are not insured Linear 0.0069
Time to clear debris Exponential 0.0581
Miles of highway and road closures
Mutual dependent 0.0144
Time for which highways and roads are closed
Number of cancelled flights
Mutual dependent 0.0122
Time to restore normal airport operations
Number of waterway port closures
Mutual dependent 0.0057
Time until ports return to full operations
Number of residential homes without electricity
Mutual dependent 0.0087
Time that residential homes do not have electricity
Number of commercial buildings without electricity
Mutual dependent 0.0080
Time that commercial buildings do not have electricity
Number of residential homes without gas
Mutual dependent 0.0066
Time that residential homes do not have gas
Number of commercial buildings without gas
Mutual dependent 0.0050
Time that commercial buildings do not have gas
Availability of fuel (gasoline) Linear 0.0044
Number of telephone lines/poles damaged
Mutual dependent 0.0104
Time to repair telephone lines/poles
Number of people who lose internet connectivity
Mutual dependent 0.0121
Time to restore internet connectivity
Number of sewage line closures
Mutual dependent 0.0209
Time to restore sewage lines
Number of destroyed homes
Mutual dependent 0.0131
Time to replace destroyed homes




Time to repair damaged homes
Square miles of habitat destroyed
Mutual dependent 0.0195
Time until habitat is restored
Number of animals impacted Linear 0.0184
Pollution in air Linear 0.0112
Pollution in water Linear 0.0101
Pollution in soil Linear 0.0054
Agricultural yield loss
Mutual dependent 0.0206
Time to recover agricultural yield loss
Loss of livestock Linear 0.0152
Number of people without sufficient food
Mutual dependent 0.0740
Time until food shortage ends
Availability of potable water Exponential 0.0852
Ratio of post-disruption capability to pre-disruption ca-
pability of medical services
Linear 0.0354
Number of law-enforcement officers available post-
disruption
Linear 0.0286
Number of firefighters available post-disruption Linear 0.0327
Number of schools open post-disaster
Mutual dependent 0.0088
Time until all schools are reopened
Number of students who attend schools Linear 0.0074
Number of employees working in social, safety-net services Linear 0.0258
5.3 Strategies to increase resilience
The city leadership is provided with four different strategies designed to increase their commu-
nity’s resilience. Each strategy places focus on different aspects of the community.
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Strategy 1: This strategy focuses on social resilience and infrastructure resilience.
Strategy 2: This strategy focuses on social resilience, economic resilience and resource resilience.
Strategy 3: This strategy focuses on economic resilience and infrastructure resilience.
Strategy 4: This strategy focuses on social resilience and post-disaster functionality of critical
services.
Each strategy’s performance is depicted in Table 5.8.
Table 5.8: Strategies to increase community resilience
Attribute Units
Stra- Stra- Stra- Stra-
tegy 1 tegy 2 tegy 3 tegy 4
Fatalities (SV residents) Count 30 33 118 32
Injuries (SV residents) Count 550 480 948 780
Displaced residents (SV) % residents 6 6.8 12.3 13
New housing for displaced
residents (SV)
% of displaced resi-
dents
85 87.2 75 93
Fatalities (non-SV residents) Count 30 55 97 26
Injuries (non-SV residents) Count 550 386 952 1200
Displaced residents (non-
SV)
% residents 10 8.5 10 10
New housing for displaced
residents (non-SV)
% of displaced resi-
dents
85 100 60 100
Residents’ fear % residents 25 39 58 65
Symptoms of PTSD % residents 7 25 18 5
Personal disruption of
lifestyle
% residents 50 50 97 70
Number of people who relo-
cate from the community
% residents 3 1 2.8 1.2
Inconvenience to residents % residents 80 70 100 85
Direct losses Millions of dollars 1200 480 650 1200
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Table 5.8 (continued)
Number of business closures Count 352 158 146 287
Length of time of business
closure
Days 173 88 42 52
Number of permanent busi-
ness closures
Count 98 50 94 157
Number of residents who
cannot find jobs or work
again
% residents 12.7 6.5 5.3 3.5
Number of residents who
cannot find jobs
% residents 11 11.2 9.8 7
Number of available jobs
that cannot find suitable em-
ployees
% of jobs 29 87 100 56
Time until available jobs are
filled
Days 297 286 285 224
Income losses of SV residents Millions of dollars 18.522 5.2 2.58 8
Income losses of non-SV res-
idents
Millions of dollars 58.7 36.52 52 78
Residential losses that are
not insured
Millions of dollars 79.6 150 139 225
Time to clear debris Days 14 26 12 24
Miles of highway and road
closures
Miles 15 56 59 102
Time for which highways and
roads are closed
Days 18 24 28 28
Number of cancelled flights Count 28 112 78 67
Time to restore normal air-
port operations
Days 55 74 60 65
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Table 5.8 (continued)
Number of waterway port
closures
% of ports 25 80 20 50
Time until ports return to
full operations
Days 42 48 45 70
Number of residential homes
without electricity
Count 750 1237 2300 1800
Time that residential homes
do not have electricity
Days 8 9 18 12
Number of commercial
buildings without electricity
Count 900 1765 2280 2350
Time that commercial build-
ings do not have electricity
Days 15 21 21 18
Number of residential homes
without gas
Count 1234 2200 3200 3800
Time that residential homes
do not have gas
Days 25 33 22 37
Number of commercial
buildings without gas
Count 2587 3691 3699 4600
Time that commercial build-
ings do not have gas
Days 37 54 54 49
Availability of fuel (gasoline) % of operational
gas stations
69 34 55 84
Number of telephone
lines/poles damaged
Count 5398 7322 8644 7462
Time to repair telephone
lines/poles
Days 150 165 200 140
Number of people who lose
internet connectivity
Count 340,000 340,000 140,000 330,000
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Table 5.8 (continued)
Time to restore internet con-
nectivity
Days 142 148 35 180
Number of sewage line clo-
sures
Count 78 180 280 300
Time to restore sewage lines Days 11 45 21 37
Number of destroyed homes Count 280 469 700 580
Time to replace destroyed
homes
Days 720 843 750 1200
Number of damaged homes Count 3267 3600 3200 3200
Time to repair damaged
homes
Days 1359 1599 1500 1100
Square miles of habitat de-
stroyed
Sq. miles 547 185 180 200
Time until habitat is re-
stored
Projected years 12 9 6.5 21.5
Number of animals impacted Count 2944 1578 3800 7000
Pollution in air Air quality index 135 140 125 128
Pollution in water Water quality in-
dex
58 61 35 48
Pollution in soil Soil Quality index 48 56 32 82
Agricultural yield loss Tons 1,200,000 850,000 830,000 530,000




6 3 2 5
Loss of livestock Count of animals 175,000 145,000 83,000 111,000
Number of people without
sufficient food
Count 15,000 25,000 26,500 102,500
Time until food shortage
ends
Days 12 17 7 22
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Table 5.8 (continued)
Availability of potable water % of residents with
access to potable
water
95 96.5 97 92
Ratio of post-disruption ca-
pability to pre-disruption ca-
pability of medical services






45 84 65 96




93 96 80 99




85 75 75 90
Time until all schools are re-
opened
Days 14 4 30 21




80 75 88 96
Number of employees work-




70 90 100 100
5.4 Evaluation of alternatives





where R is resilience, wi is the trade-off weight corresponding to attribute i, and vi is the value
corresponding to attribute i.
The values provided by each alternative, vi, can be calculated using the value functions elicited
in section 5.1. These values are displayed in Table 5.9.
Table 5.9: Values provided by strategies
Attribute
Stra- Stra- Stra- Stra-
tegy 1 tegy 2 tegy 3 tegy 4
Fatalities (SV residents) 0.8 0.78 0.213 0.787
Injuries (SV residents) 0.633 0.68 0.368 0.48
Displaced residents (SV) 0.76 0.728 0.508 0.48
New housing for displaced residents (SV) 0.85 0.872 0.75 0.93
Fatalities (non-SV residents) 0.85 0.725 0.515 0.87
Injuries (non-SV residents) 0.78 0.846 0.619 0.52
Displaced residents (non-SV) 0.714 0.757 0.714 0.714
New housing for displaced residents (non-SV) 0.85 1 0.6 1
Residents’ fear 0.667 0.48 0.227 0.133
Symptoms of PTSD 0.767 0.167 0.4 0.833
Personal disruption of lifestyle 0.5 0.5 0.03 0.3
Number of people who relocate from the com-
munity
0.85 0.95 0.86 0.94
Inconvenience to residents 0.2 0.3 0 0.15
Direct losses 0 0.307 0.173 0
Number of business closures
0 0.742 0.886 0.724
Length of time of business closure
Number of permanent business closures 0.51 0.75 0.53 0.215
Number of residents who cannot find jobs or
work again
0 0.35 0.47 0.65
Number of residents who cannot find jobs 0.45 0.44 0.51 0.65
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Table 5.9 (continued)
Number of available jobs that cannot find suit-
able employees
0.764 0.318 0.219 0.656
Time until available jobs are filled
Income losses of SV residents 0 0.653 0.828 0.467
Income losses of non-SV residents 0.413 0.6348 0.48 0.22
Residential losses that are not insured 0.602 0.25 0.305 0
Time to clear debris 0.319 0.054 0.385 0.086
Miles of highway and road closures
0.888 0.44 0.312 0
Time for which highways and roads are closed
Number of cancelled flights
0.829 0.079 0.48 0.516
Time to restore normal airport operations
Number of waterway port closures
0.825 0.36 0.85 0.417
Time until ports return to full operations
Number of residential homes without electricity
0.8 0.629 0 0.28
Time that residential homes do not have electric-
ity
Number of commercial buildings without elec-
tricity
0.82 0.506 0.361 0.436
Time that commercial buildings do not have elec-
tricity
Number of residential homes without gas
0.657 0.193 0.218 0
Time that residential homes do not have gas
Number of commercial buildings without gas
0.681 0.336 0.334 0.249
Time that commercial buildings do not have gas
Availability of fuel (gasoline) 0.69 0.34 0.55 0.84
Number of telephone lines/poles damaged
0.55 0.329 0.04 0.42
Time to repair telephone lines/poles
Number of people who lose internet connectivity
0.54 0.521 0.953 0.434
Time to restore internet connectivity
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Table 5.9 (continued)
Number of sewage line closures
0.886 0 0.216 0
Time to restore sewage lines
Number of destroyed homes
0.755 0.519 0.361 0.153
Time to replace destroyed homes
Number of damaged homes
0.513 0.369 0.474 0.614
Time to repair damaged homes
Square miles of habitat destroyed
0 0.556 0.688 0
Time until habitat is restored
Number of animals impacted 0.607 0.79 0.493 0.067
Pollution in air 0.9 0.933 0.833 0.853
Pollution in water 0.508 0.554 0.154 0.354
Pollution in soil 0.35 0.45 0.15 0.775
Agricultural yield loss
0 0.363 0.585 0.338
Time to recover agricultural yield loss
Loss of livestock 0.3 0.42 0.668 0.556
Number of people without sufficient food
0.96 0.906 0.959 0.499
Time until food shortage ends
Availability of potable water 0.821 0.872 0.889 0.725
Ratio of post-disruption capability to pre-
disruption capability of medical services
0.6 0.9 0.7 0.86
Number of law-enforcement officers available
post-disruption
0 0.68 0.3 0.92
Number of firefighters available post-disruption 0.86 0.92 0.6 0.98
Number of schools open post-disaster
0.93 0.967 0.75 0.93
Time until all schools are reopened
Number of students who attend schools 0.714 0.643 0.829 0.943
Number of employees working in social, safety-
net services
0.4 0.8 1 1
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These values will be used in equation (1) along with the weights from Table 5.7 to calculate a
final resilience value provided by each strategy.
5.5 Results
The resilience provided by the proposed strategies are displayed in Table 5.10.






Some strategies perform better than the others in some aspects since each strategy focuses on
different aspects of a community. This can be seen in the break down of each strategy as displayed
in Figure 5.1 and Table 5.11.
Figure 5.1 Breakdown of strategies
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Table 5.11 Breakdown of strategies
Category Strategy 1 Strategy 2 Strategy 3 Strategy 4
Social resilience 0.199 0.188 0.121 0.181
Economic resilience 0.024 0.068 0.059 0.038
Infrastructure resilience 0.117 0.047 0.073 0.043
Environmental resilience 0.028 0.044 0.034 0.018
Resource resilience 0.145 0.155 0.169 0.114
Post disaster functionality
of critical services
0.073 0.115 0.092 0.13
Community resilience 0.587 0.618 0.548 0.524
Strategy 2 outperforms the other strategies when it comes to total resilience. This is because
the decision makers have placed high importance on social and resource resilience and strategy 2
performs really well in these areas. Strategy 2 also performs well in economic resilience.
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION
This thesis aims to apply the principles of decision analysis and VFT to the domain of disaster
resilience. It employs an objectives hierarchy to clearly define the objectives of a decision maker.
The objectives hierarchy focuses on fundamental objectives of protecting and recovering parts of a
community that are necessary for proper functioning: people, economy, infrastructure, environment,
resources, and emergency services. The combination of these objectives provide insight into the
resilience of a community. Each of these six objectives are decomposed into sub-objectives and
eventually result in measurable attributes. Unlike most measures for community resilience currently
found in the literature, the attributes proposed in this thesis consist of outcomes from a disruptive
event as opposed to inputs or characteristics of a community.
This thesis includes almost scores of attributes that a community leader may want to consider
in assessing resilience. The use and importance of these attributes will vary from one community
to another. For example, a decision maker from a metropolitan community would place less im-
portance or weight on agricultural resilience. This approach can help a decision maker evaluate
and compare strategies for enhancing community resilience. Each strategy for resilience will change
the level of multiple attributes in the hierarchy. The knowledge of the decision maker’s objectives,
value functions, and weights can also help in devising better strategies for increasing a community’s
resilience.
A limitation of this method is that collecting data for its successful implementation can be
very time consuming and poses many obstacles. A lot of data to inform these attributes may not
even be available. A consequence of the lack of data is that measuring these attributes will be
highly uncertain. Future work on how assess these attributes can incorporate uncertainties, and
Monte Carlo simulation can be used to integrate the uncertainties into the VFT approach. Further
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research can also aggregate the metrics into a final value for resilience. Other decision makers may
also want to include more attributes.
Humans have developed technologies to overcome many problems, but natural disasters con-
tinue to be a challenge. Since natural events are too big to be prevented, we must focus our
efforts towards making our communities more resilient towards disruptions. Many researchers have
worked on measuring and improving community resilience, but community leaders still struggle
with determining how to implement strategies to enhance their communities’ resilience. This thesis
constructs measures focused on what decision makers value in order to provide better and more
actionable measures for resilience.
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